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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKAY, Circuit Judge. 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant Cheri DiFederico appeals the decision 
of the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania denying her relief under S 510 of the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act [ERISA], 29 
U.S.C. S 1140, a provision that makes it unlawful to 
interfere with the attainment of rights or benefits associated 
with an employee benefit plan. 
 
In her complaint before the district court, Plaintiff alleged 
that Defendant-Appellee Rolm Company1 terminated her 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Plaintiff also included Defendant-Appellee Siemens Rolm 
Communications, Inc., as a defendant in her complaint even though the 
communications surrounding Plaintiff's termination were exchanged 
exclusively between Plaintiff (through herself, her lawyer, and doctors) 
and Defendant-Appellee Rolm Company. The record on appeal does not 
establish the exact relationship between Rolm Company and Siemens 
Rolm Communications, other than a disclosure of corporate affiliation in 
Appellees' Brief indicating that Siemens Rolm Communications, Inc., was 
"formerly Rolm Company," and an indication on the letterhead of 
Plaintiff's termination notice in the record that Rolm Company was an 
"IBM and Siemens Company." J.A. at JA117. The district court's 
opinions in this case do not clarify why Siemens Rolm Communications 
might be liable for interfering with Plaintiff's disability benefits, see 
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employment to avoid obligations under its short- and long- 
term sickness and disability plans. The district court 
granted Defendant partial summary judgment, ruling that 
the short-term plan was not a qualified plan under ERISA 
and dismissing all claims arising out of that plan. See 
DiFederico v. Rolm Co., No. CIV.A.94-CV-6901, 1995 WL 
710561, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 1995). The district court 
then conducted a bench trial on the remaining issues 
arising out of the long-term plan. 
 
The testimony and evidence presented to the district 
court indicate that Plaintiff worked as a sales engineer for 
Defendant from 1983 to 1990, and as a field salesperson 
from 1990 to November of 1991. Early in 1991, Plaintiff 
began developing symptoms of chronic fatigue and chronic 
colitis which began affecting her job performance until she 
eventually took short-term sick leave once in July 1991 and 
again from September 3, 1991, to November 18, 1991, 
when her employment was terminated. The situation 
surrounding her termination was, of course, the most hotly 
contested evidentiary point of the trial. Plaintiff alleged that 
the correspondence between herself, her doctor, her lawyer, 
and Defendant and the circumstantial evidence 
surrounding the exchange of communications lead only to 
the conclusion that Defendant terminated her employment 
in an attempt to save money and rid itself of costly long- 
term disability benefits obligations. Defendant presented 
evidence to the contrary, arguing that, far from ridding 
itself of disability obligations, it attempted to accommodate 
Plaintiff's developing medical condition until it became clear 
that Plaintiff was not going to accept the accommodations 
and return to work. In its review of Defendant's evidence, 
the district court found it "clear . . . that at all times up 
until November 18, 1991 defendant had an opinion from an 
independent doctor that plaintiff could return to work with 
restrictions." DiFederico v. Rolm Co., No. CIV.A.94-6901, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
DiFederico v. Rolm Co., No. CIV.A.94-6901, 1996 WL 53808, at *1 (E.D. 
Pa. Feb. 7, 1996); DiFederico v. Rolm Co., No. CIV.A.94-CV-6901, 1995 
WL 710561, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 1995), but the point appears to be 
uncontested and insignificant in this appeal. For purposes of this 
opinion, references to Defendant are meant to include both entities. 
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1996 WL 53808, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 1996). The record, 
according to the district court, showed that before 
November 11, 1991, Defendant offered Plaintiff a new 
position with the company--an office job as a sales 
engineer not requiring travel and situated near restroom 
facilities for those moments of acute colitis. The record also 
showed that on November 11, Defendant informed Plaintiff 
that failure to appear for work at the new position by 
November 18, 1991, would be considered voluntary 
resignation. The district court found that notwithstanding 
Defendant's attempts to accommodate Plaintiff's condition 
Plaintiff failed to report for work, and, as a result, her 
employment was terminated on November 18, 1991. See id. 
at *4. 
 
At the close of the bench trial, the district court held that 
while Plaintiff established a prima facie case of interference 
she failed to prove that the legitimate nondiscriminatory 
reason offered by her employer for her termination was 
pretextual. See id. at *5. According to the district court, the 
decision to terminate Plaintiff was not based on an intent to 
withhold benefits, rather it "was based upon [P]laintiff's 
failure to report for work even after [D]efendant made a 
bona fide effort to accommodate her health problems." Id. 
at *5 n.3. 
 
In this appeal Plaintiff claims that the district court (1) 
applied an erroneous legal standard to her showing of 
pretext, (2) erred in requiring her to prove that her 
employer's intent to interfere was the sole cause of her 
termination, and (3) erred in finding that she had failed to 
prove that her employer's reason was pretextual. We 
exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
We begin by addressing the question of whether the 
district court applied an erroneous legal standard to 
Plaintiff's showing that Defendant's reasons for terminating 
her were pretextual. We apply a plenary standard when 
reviewing a district court's application of legal standards to 
the facts. See FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of 
Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 838 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
Section 510 of ERISA prohibits " `employers from 
discharging or harassing their employees in order to keep 
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them from obtaining [employee] benefits.' " DeWitt v. Penn- 
Del Directory Corp., 106 F.3d 514, 522 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(quoting Haberern v. Kaupp Vascular Surgeons Ltd., 24 F.3d 
1491, 1501 (3d Cir. 1994)). The legal standard in S 510 
cases is very clear. To recover, a plaintiff must demonstrate 
that the defendant had the " `specific intent' " to violate 
S 510. Id. This requires the plaintiff to show that "the 
employer made a conscious decision to interfere with the 
employee's attainment of pension eligibility or additional 
benefits." Id. at 523 (citing Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 
812 F.2d 834, 860 (3d Cir. 1987)). The plaintiff may use 
both direct and circumstantial evidence to establish specific 
intent, but when the plaintiff offers no direct evidence that 
a violation of S 510 has occurred, the court applies a 
shifting burdens analysis, similar to that applied in Title VII 
employment discrimination claims. See Gavalik, 812 F.2d 
at 851-53 (applying the McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792, 
802 (1973), shifting burdens mechanism). In this burden- 
shifting analysis, the plaintiff must first establish a prima 
facie case by showing: "(1) prohibited employer conduct (2) 
taken for the purpose of interfering (3) with the attainment 
of any right to which the employee may become entitled." 
Id. at 852. If the plaintiff is successful in demonstrating her 
prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant- 
employer, who must articulate a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the prohibited conduct. If the 
employer carries its burden, the plaintiff then must 
persuade the court by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the employer's legitimate reason is pretextual. See Texas 
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252- 
53 (1981). 
 
In the case at hand, the district court applied the shifting 
burdens framework correctly. After Plaintiff established her 
prima facie case, Defendant articulated a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employment 
decision--explaining that it fired Plaintiff for failing to 
return to work even after it had attempted to accommodate 
her condition. After Defendant carried its burden, Plaintiff 
was permitted to present evidence that Defendant's reason 
was pretextual. Plaintiff produced circumstantial evidence 
of Defendant's financial difficulties coinciding with her 
dismissal, but the district court concluded that Plaintiff's 
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evidence was not enough to prove that Defendant's 
legitimate reason was a pretext. See DiFederico, 1996 WL 
53808, at *5. The court explained that to find that 
Defendant had the specific intent to interfere with Plaintiff's 
attainment of benefits, Plaintiff would have needed to prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that "the reasons 
offered by defendant . . . [were] not credible." Id. Such 
evidence would have then supported the inference that "the 
employer was motivated by an unlawful reason or reasons." 
Id. But the court concluded, "There [was] simply no 
objective evidence from which [it could] find defendant's 
explanation incredible." Id. It reviewed the "particularly . . . 
truthful and sincere" testimony of Plaintiff's supervisor and 
reported that "[t]here was not the slightest hint . . . that 
any decision with respect to [P]laintiff's continued 
employment was based upon a desire to save the 
[D]efendant from paying [long-term disability] benefits." Id. 
 
In reference to its conclusion, the court noted, 
"Unfortunately for plaintiff, there is no `smoking gun[,'] the 
lack of which is not unusual in cases of this nature." Id. 
Plaintiff seizes upon this statement as evidence that the 
court, while ostensibly stating the correct legal standard, 
actually applied an erroneous legal standard that would 
require her to present direct evidence of a smoking gun to 
prove that her employer's reason was pretextual. See 
Appellant's Reply Br. at 1. It seems to us, however, that the 
court was simply explaining its application of the 
circumstantial evidence standard. Cf. Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 
852 ("In most cases . . . specific intent to discriminate will 
not be demonstrated by `smoking gun' evidence. As a 
result, the evidentiary burden in discrimination cases may 
also be satisfied by the introduction of circumstantial 
evidence." The court was merely commenting on an 
unfortunate reality: Plaintiff could not present any direct 
evidence of her employer's specific intent to interfere, and 
the circumstantial evidence she presented in place of direct 
evidence was not compelling. We cannot conclude that the 
district court's comments in this regard amounted to the 
application of an erroneous legal standard. 
 
Alleging another error of law, Plaintiff claims that when 
the district court required her to prove that Defendant's 
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proffered legitimate reason was pretextual, it actually 
required her to prove that Defendant's discriminatory 
motive was "the sole cause" of her termination. Appellant's 
Amended Br. at 35. Plaintiff argues that the law only 
requires her to prove that her employer's intent to interfere 
" `contributed to' " or was " `a motivating factor in' " the 
decision to terminate her employment. Id. at 35 (quoting 
Humphreys v. Bellaire Corp., 966 F.2d 1037, 1043 (6th Cir. 
1992)). Her argument seems to confuse several statements 
of the legal standard applicable in S 510 cases. 
 
While it is true we have stated that "a plaintiff need not 
prove that `the sole reason for his [or her] termination was 
to interfere with [employee benefit] rights,' " DeWitt, 106 
F.3d at 522 (quoting Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 851), once the 
defendant articulates and presents evidence of a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the plaintiff must 
meet its " `ultimate burden of persuasion,' " St. Mary's 
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993); see also 
Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 859, by proving that the defendant 
discriminated against her. See Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 
F.3d 586, 597 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[T]he plaintiff's burden is to 
show that the prohibited consideration played a role in the 
decisionmaking process and that it had a determinative 
influence on the outcome of that process.") To satisfy this 
burden in circumstantial evidence cases like this one, a 
plaintiff must prove that the legitimate reason proffered by 
the defendant was pretext for the real discriminatory reason 
behind the employment action.2See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 
256 (holding that after a defendant sets forth a legitimate 
reason, the plaintiff must "demonstrate that the proffered 
reason was not the true reason for the employment 
decision"). A plaintiff "may succeed in this either directly by 
persuading the court that the discriminatory reason more 
likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that 
the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Proving that the legitimate reason was pretext is necessary to 
establish a discriminatory claim but might not be sufficient. "A finding 
that the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation is a pretext permits, 
but does not require, the trier of fact to conclude that the employer 
discriminated against the plaintiff based on the ground alleged." Miller, 
47 F.3d at 596 (citing Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511) (emphasis added). 
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credence." Id. Thus, the analysis of pretext is designed to 
focus the court's attention on whether the defendant's 
proffered reason is the real reason. It assumes that if the 
plaintiff had evidence of other illegitimate motivating factors 
which contributed to the employment decision, she either 
would have used that evidence in her attempt to persuade 
the court that the defendant's legitimate reason was pretext 
or would have included direct evidence of those motivations 
in her initial action and circumvented the entire 
circumstantial evidence inquiry altogether. See, e.g., 
Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 853 (noting that where the plaintiff's 
case consists of direct evidence, the McDonnell Douglas- 
Burdine shifting burdens mechanism is inapplicable). 
 
Plaintiff is correct to point out that the plaintiff of a 
circumstantial evidence case need not prove that the intent 
to interfere was the sole reason for the adverse employment 
decision. Her argument is not necessarily inapplicable to 
cases applying the circumstantial evidence standard, see, 
e.g., Miller, 47 F.3d at 597 & n.9 (describing the 
applicability of a plaintiff-need-not-prove-sole-cause 
instruction in pretext cases "where the plaintiff's evidence 
of discrimination is sufficiently `direct' to shift the burden of 
proof to the employer on the issue of whether the same 
decision would have been made in the absence of the 
discriminatory animus"), but the primary focus of the 
court's analysis in those cases is different. The court is 
presented with a single legitimate reason proffered by the 
defendant which the plaintiff is trying to prove pretextual 
with an argument constructed from the coincidence of a 
number of circumstances. This is where the pretext 
analysis is so useful. If the plaintiff proves that her 
employer's proffered reason was pretext, the court may 
infer that the employer was in fact motivated by the specific 
intent to interfere with the attainment of benefits. If, on the 
other hand, the plaintiff fails to prove that her employer's 
proffered legitimate reason was pretext, she has not 
persuaded the court that a discriminatory reason played 
any role in her termination of employment and it helps her 
case little to speak of other possibly contributing reasons.3 A 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. While our opinions and the opinions of other circuits do sometimes 
use terms like "a motivating factor," "contributing factor" and "sole 
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court, like the district court in this case, simply cannot 
make the unfounded inference that an employer acted with 
the specific intent to interfere with the plaintiff's attainment 
of benefits. 
 
The situation presented by this case makes Plaintiff's sole 
cause argument somewhat beguiling. While it may have 
appeared that the court was forcing Plaintiff to prove that 
the discriminatory reason was the sole cause of her 
termination, the district court in fact did not require 
Plaintiff to prove that one reason or another was the sole 
cause of her termination. It merely required her to prove, as 
part of her ultimate burden of persuasion, that Defendant's 
proffered legitimate reason was pretext. Cf. Burdine, 450 
U.S. at 256 (holding that after a defendant sets forth a 
legitimate reason, the plaintiff must "demonstrate that the 
proffered reason was not the true reason for the 
employment decision"). Plaintiff's sole cause arguments are 
simply extraneous to our review of the district court's 
analysis. 
 
Plaintiff's argument that the district court should have 
applied "a motivating factor" standard to her claim is 
mistaken as well because she was required to "show that 
the prohibited consideration played a role in the 
decisionmaking process and that it had a determinative 
influence on the outcome of that process." Miller, 47 F.3d at 
597 (emphasis added). The circumstantial evidence Plaintiff 
presented in this case failed to convince the district court 
that her employer's intent to interfere was even a factor at 
all in the employment decision. After reviewing the 
testimony of Plaintiff's supervisor, the district court 
determined that "[t]here was not the slightest hint . . . that 
any decision with respect to [P]laintiff's continued 
employment was based upon a desire to save [D]efendant 
from paying [the long-term disability] benefits." DiFederico, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
reason" to describe and characterize what is or is not an employer's 
motive, see DeWitt, 106 F.3d at 522; Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 851; 
Humphreys, 966 F.2d at 1043, we believe it is preferable, in a pretext 
case analysis, to speak either in terms of "determinative" as the district 
court did in this case, DiFederico, 1996 WL 53808, at *5; see also Miller, 
47 F.3d at 597, or "real reason" as the Supreme Court did in Hicks, 509 
U.S. at 511 n.4. 
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1996 WL 53808, at *5. The court simply could notfind any 
evidence, direct or circumstantial, upon which to make an 
inference that her employer was motivated in its decision 
by unlawful reasons. The district court stated:"There has 
to be more than the coincidence of these two factors 
(defendant's financial woes and plaintiff's termination) to 
support an inference that the one came about as a result 
of the other." Id. at *6. We conclude that the court did not 
err in allocating the burdens of persuasion and the 
corresponding legal standards for circumstantial evidence 
cases. 
 
In her final claim on appeal, Plaintiff argues that the 
district court erred in finding that her circumstantial 
evidence did not prove that Defendant's legitimate reason 
was pretextual. Plaintiff does not appear to challenge 
whether the district court had an adequate factual basis 
upon which it could base its ultimate determination that 
she failed to show pretext. Instead, she contends that the 
court's "underlying factual findings" themselves were 
"unsupported by substantial evidence, lacked adequate 
evidentiary support in the record, were against the clear 
weight of the evidence, and/or were the product of a 
misapprehension of the weight of the evidence." Appellant's 
Amended Br. at 36-37. In other words, Plaintiff asserts not 
that the district court's ultimate conclusion lacks sufficient 
factual support but that those factual findings themselves 
are unfounded. We review a district court's factualfindings 
for clear error. See Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 850. Under the 
clearly erroneous standard, however, " `[i]t is the 
responsibility of an appellate court to accept the ultimate 
factual determination of the fact-finder unless that 
determination either (1) is completely devoid of minimum 
evidentiary support displaying some hue of credibility, or (2) 
bears no rational relationship to the supportive evidentiary 
data.' " Coalition to Save Our Children v. Board of Educ., 90 
F.3d 752, 759 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Krasnov v. Dinan, 
465 F.2d 1298, 1302 (3d Cir. 1972)). 
 
Plaintiff complains that the district court's findings 
number 18, 23, 27, 28, 30, 31, 38, 42, and 44 are clearly 
erroneous. Instead of addressing each of the challenged 
findings in turn, as briefed by the parties, we can conclude 
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that the district court's findings involved credibility 
determinations which are supported by the record and 
which we will not second-guess. While there may be 
evidence and inferences to the contrary, we cannot say that 
the findings are devoid of credible evidentiary support or 
that they lack a rational relationship to the evidentiary 
data. Based on our review of the record as a whole, we hold 
that none of the district court's factual findings are clearly 
erroneous and we affirm the court's ultimate conclusion. 
 
AFFIRMED. 
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